Substance Use as a Second Class Disability: A Survey of the ADA\u27s Disarmament of Individuals in Recovery by Schmitz, Ryan
Maine Law Review 
Volume 73 Number 1 Article 4 
January 2021 
Substance Use as a Second Class Disability: A Survey of the 
ADA's Disarmament of Individuals in Recovery 
Ryan Schmitz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Disability Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ryan Schmitz, Substance Use as a Second Class Disability: A Survey of the ADA's Disarmament of 
Individuals in Recovery, 73 Me. L. Rev. 93 (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol73/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
 
 
SUBSTANCE USE AS A SECOND-CLASS 
DISABILITY: A SURVEY OF THE ADA’S 




I. SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS AS SECOND-CLASS DISABILITIES UNDER THE ADA 
 A. What Does “Currently Engaging” Mean? 
II. SURVEY OF THE LAW 
A. “Current Use” Under Title I of the ADA 
1. Circuit Courts Defining the Boundaries of “Current Use” Under 
the ADA 
2. District Courts Applying the “Current Use Exception” 
B. “Current Use” Under Title II of the ADA 
C. Housing Discrimination Under the FHA, Rehabilitation Act, and the 
ADA 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Amend the Legislation 
1. Strike the Exception from the Statute 
2. Treat Substance Use Disorders Involving Illegal Drugs the Same 
as Alcohol Use Disorder 
3. Require Covered Entities to Provide a Last Chance Agreement to 
an Individual in Active Use Before Taking an Adverse Action 
B. Executive Action 
CONCLUSION 
  
                                                                                                     
* Staff Attorney, Disability Rights Maine, B.A., Boston College; J.D., Georgetown University Law 
Center.  Thank you to Disability Rights Maine for your support in writing this Article and to Shianne 
Bowlin for your help with research and writing.  Thanks also to Natalie Petrone, O.T.D., for your 
guidance from the conception of this Article through its publication. 
94 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1 
ABSTRACT 
The Americans with Disabilities Act and Fair Housing Act are landmark statutes 
that afford essential protections to individuals with disabilities in the foundational 
areas of everyday life.  Despite their recognition of substance use disorders as 
disabilities, these statutes deny protection to individuals who are either in active use 
or in the early stages of their recovery.  This Article explores the dangers posed by 
the “current use exception” and surveys the case law to determine the extent of the 
harms done to individuals with disabilities who seek to vindicate the rights 
purportedly guaranteed to them by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Fair 
Housing Act.  The sum total of these cases paints a grim picture of the present legal 
conception of substance use disorders not as diseases, but as moral failings.  Further, 
it counsels in favor of changing the laws to more equitably address the realities of 
substance use disorders and recovery. 
INTRODUCTION 
“[I]t is clear from both the text of the ADA and its legislative history that 
Congress intended to treat drug addiction differently from other impairments 
and disabilities.”1 
 
In March of 2011, Doctor Quinones voluntarily admitted herself to an alcohol 
rehabilitation program.2  Upon completion of the program that July, she returned to 
the workforce with new prescriptions for several medications.3  She subsequently 
entered a residency program with the University of Puerto Rico.4  However, Doctor 
Quinones developed a dependence on her prescription medications.5  Eventually, her 
dependence progressed into a substance use disorder which affected her job 
performance.6  In May 2012, Doctor Quinones sought recovery through abstinence 
from her prescription medications, active participation in Alcoholics and Narcotics 
Anonymous, and the aid of a behavioral therapist.7  Despite her active efforts to 
sustain her recovery, that September the University terminated her employment in 
the residency program.8  In response, she requested reinstatement and a reasonable 
accommodation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).9  
The reinstatement hearings took place in November, roughly seven months after 
she began her recovery from misuse of prescription drugs, and over a year and a half 
since she began her abstinence from alcohol.10  Nonetheless, the University felt that 
her drug use was recent enough to present an ongoing issue.11  Doctor Quinones was 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Quinones v. Univ. of P.R., No. 14-1331 (JAG), 2015 WL 631327, at *5 (D.P.R. Feb. 13, 2015). 
 2.  Id. at *1. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at *1, *6.  By this time, Doctor Quinones had been abstinent from alcohol for over a year. 
Id. at *1. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
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officially barred from employment in the program in April 2013.12  She sued the 
University in federal court for discriminating on the basis of her substance use 
disorder.13  At the summary judgment phase, the court agreed with the University’s 
conclusions, finding that at the time of her initial termination Doctor Quinones was 
still a current user of illicit drugs.14  Thus, she was not protected by the ADA.15  
Doctor Quinones’ story is not unique.  It is, however, illustrative of one of the most 
glaring maladies infecting our civil rights laws:  substance use disorders are second-
class disabilities. 
Stigma against individuals with substance use disorders is pervasive.  Its effects 
can be felt in virtually every facet of American public and professional life.16  The 
stigma is so culturally ingrained that it has embedded itself in the statute purporting 
to protect the rights of individuals with disabilities.  The ADA takes several steps to 
distinguish substance use disorders from all other disabilities.17  Most notably, 
section 12114(a) excludes individuals with substance use disorders from the 
definition of disabled, even when they are actively experiencing a symptom of their 
disease.18  This exclusion (the “current use exception”) categorically denies 
protection to anyone “currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs.”19   
  The court’s conclusion in Quinones, which declined to protect an individual 
with seven months of sustained abstinence from illicit drug use and who had sought 
rehabilitative counseling, precisely illustrates the legal barrier faced by millions of 
Americans with substance use disorders.  Substance use disorders have been declared 
quasi-disabilities by Congress, the courts, and the regulatory agencies charged with 
                                                                                                     
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at *1. 
 14.  Id. at *7. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Even those counted among the “highly educated” professional class, such as doctors and 
lawyers, have shown to be heavily biased by anti-substance use disorder stigma.  See, e.g., Jason B. 
Luoma et al., Stigma Predicts Residential Treatment Length for Substance Use Disorder, 40 AM. J. 
DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 206, 209 (2014) (“The stigmatizing attitudes of the public and healthcare 
professionals serve as barriers to seeking treatment and affect treatment outcomes among users of illicit 
drugs, and, in the SUD area, stigma has been shown to be related to treatment delay or avoidance.”) 
(internal citation omitted); Patrick R. Krill et al., The Prevalence of Substance Use and Other Mental 
Health Concerns Among American Attorneys, 10 J. ADDICTION MED. 46, 52 (2016) (advocating for 
increased education to combat the “pervasive stigma surrounding substance use disorders and mental 
health concerns” among lawyers and judges). 
 17.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2009). 
 18.  Id. Substance use disorders are chronic diseases of the brain.  Symptoms include decreased 
executive functioning, increased stress levels, excruciating physical withdrawal, and relapse.  See 
Thomas R. Kosten & Tony P. George, The Neurobiology of Opioid Dependence: Implications for 
Treatment, 1 SCI. PRACT. PERSP. 13 (2002). 
 19.  § 12114(a).  Additionally, this definition creates an extraordinarily narrow definition of 
recovery.  A person must maintain complete abstinence, free of any tapered use or relapse, for months in 
order to qualify.  The construction also raises significant questions about the definition of abstinence.  Is 
a person who is in abstinence-based recovery for opioid use disorder a current user if he or she smokes 
marijuana?  Despite the various substance use disorders that have individual designations in the DSM-
V, the legislation, regulations, and technical guidance are silent on whether a person qualifying as an 
individual with a substance use disorder needs to be abstinent from all illegal drug use, or abstinent only 
from the substances for which they have a diagnosed substance use disorder.  This question will almost 
certainly require an answer soon, especially given the rise in treatment with medical marijuana.  
However, the issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
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defining and enforcing the terms of much of our federal and state civil rights 
legislation.20  Paradoxically, the closer one gets to experiencing the symptoms of a 
substance use disorder, the smaller one’s chances of successfully vindicating one’s 
rights under the ADA.21  The “current use exception,” as interpreted by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), 
and the courts, means that any person with a substance use disorder, no matter the 
duration of their abstinence, is one relapse away from losing any protection from 
discrimination on the basis of their disability.22  In fact, under the ADA, were that 
person to relapse, she would legally lose her status as disabled altogether.23 
This article endeavors to articulate the breadth of damage caused by the “current 
use exception” and proposes strategies which could eliminate or mitigate that 
damage.  Part I discusses the practical implications of the ADA’s relegation of 
substance use disorders to second-class status.  Part II begins by introducing the key 
provisions of the ADA.  This introduction requires a close parsing of the text’s 
isolation of substance use disorders from other disabilities.  Part II then surveys the 
case law rising from discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, public 
services, programs, activities, and housing.  Finally, Part III proposes statutory and 
regulatory emendations that could either eliminate the issues rising from the 
exception altogether, or, at least mitigate damage through the proposition of a new 
jurisprudential framework.  
Scant scholarship addresses the “current use exception.”  Even fewer articles, 
notes, or comments survey the case law in a way that outlines the legal realities faced 
by employees and tenants who have experienced discrimination.  Nor does the case 
law frame the “current use exception” within a broader cultural context grounded in 
stigma.  This article shows that the ADA’s treatment of substance use disorders is a 
glaring symptom of a pervasive and anachronistic misconception of the nature of the 
disease.  Until the second-class status is lifted from substance use disorders, millions 
will continue to suffer discrimination without the possibility of legal recourse.  
I. SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS AS SECOND-CLASS DISABILITIES UNDER THE ADA 
The ADA excludes millions of individuals with disabilities from protection 
every year.  This exclusion can result in joblessness, homelessness, and death.24  To 
                                                                                                     
 20.  See id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2019) (Department of Justice regulations excluding 
individuals currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs from the definition of “[i]ndividual with a 
disability”); U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC-M1A, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON THE 
EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 8.3 (1992) 
[hereinafter EEOC Technical Assistance Manual].  This article will use language consistent with current 
medically accepted practice. 
 21.  See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
481 (5th ed. 2013).  Other words or phrases such as addiction or substance abuse disorder may be used 
in quotations and references to other works.  However, for the purposes of this article, they will refer to 
the same conditions: substance use disorders. 
 22.  See, e.g., Salley v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 978 (3d Cir. 1998) (determining that an 
employee who amassed over ten years of sustained abstinence was not a qualified individual with a 
disability after experiencing a relapse and was subsequently fired). 
 23.  See § 12114. 
 24.  See David J. Roelfs et al., Losing Life and Livelihood: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis 
of Unemployment and All-Cause Mortality, 72 SOC. SCI. & MED. 840, 847-48 (2011) (finding that the 
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understand how the exclusion manifests itself, one must analyze the way courts and 
regulators have defined the ADA’s terms.25  The ADA’s protections for persons with 
disabilities extend only to “qualified individuals.”26  Qualified individuals are those 
who are “able to perform the essential functions of their job even if only with some 
accommodation to their disability.”27  Substance use disorders are recognized as 
disabilities under the ADA.28  However, the ADA explicitly carves out an exception 
to the definition of “qualified individual” for those “currently engaging in the illegal 
use of drugs.”29  “Illegal use of drugs” refers to the use, possession, or distribution 
of substances deemed unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act.30  No other 
disabilities under the ADA face any similar carve outs.31  
The legal and cultural ramifications of a civil rights law purporting to protect 
individuals with disabilities while affirmatively sanctioning discrimination against a 
specific subset of those same individuals on the basis of their disability is difficult to 
quantify.  However, the power of anti-substance use disorder stigma in American 
culture is well-documented.32  Attitudinal biases against individuals in active use or 
in recovery hinders their ability to participate in, or benefit from, fundamental 
aspects of life such as employment, healthcare, or social services.33  Further, these 
individuals frequently internalize stigma, dampening their willingness to pursue 
                                                                                                     
risk of death for unemployed persons was sixty-three percent higher than the risk of death for employed 
persons); see also Christopher S. Carpenter et al., Economic Conditions, Illicit Drug Use, and Substance 
Use Disorders in the U.S., 52 J. HEALTH ECON. 63, 72 (2017) (finding “clear evidence that substance 
use disorders involving . . . analgesics[] and hallucinogens are [both] strongly countercyclical”); 
Lamberson v. Pennsylvania, 963 F. Supp. 2d 400, 402, 411 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (stating that during the 
pendency of litigation, a nurse challenging the suspension of her license as an alleged response to her 
treating her opioid use disorder with methadone maintenance therapy was found dead on the side of the 
road due to “mixed substance toxicity and hypothermia.”). 
 25.  See infra Part II. 
 26.  § 12114(a). 
 27.  Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., Ret. Plan of Pillsbury Co. & Am. Fed’n of Grain Millers, 268 
F.3d 456, 457 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 28.  See, e.g., Makinen v. City of New York, 857 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 2017) (acknowledging that 
the ADA “treat[s] alcoholism as an impairment that can form the basis of a disability discrimination 
suit”); § 12114(b)(1)-(3); 28 C.F.R. § 36.105(b)(22) (2019) (“The phrase physical or mental impairment 
means . . . drug addiction, and alcoholism.”). 
 29.  § 12114(a); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2019) (explaining that the “term ‘individual with a 
disability’ does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs.”). 
 30.  § 12111(6)(A). The term does not include “the use of a drug taken under supervision by a 
licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or other 
provisions of Federal law.”  Id.  Though this phrasing appears to exclude individuals participating in 
supervised rehabilitation programs, such participation does not automatically re-characterize the person 
as a qualified individual under the ADA. This result follows even if the person remains abstinent from 
any illegal substances during that period.  See Mauerhan v. Wagner Corp., 649 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 
(10th Cir. 2011); Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 858 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 31.  See, e.g., Bailey v. GaPac. Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1167 n.4 (1st Cir. 2002) (“While not 
specifically excluded from the ADA's protections, alcoholism is nevertheless treated differently than 
other impairments and disabilities.”). 
 32.  See generally Patrick F. Janulis, Understanding Addiction Stigma: Examining Desired Social 
Distance Toward Addicted Individuals, (June 2010) (M.S. thesis, DePaul University, College of Liberal 
Arts and Science).  
 33.  See Yngvild Olsen & Joshua M. Sharfstein, Confronting the Stigma of Opioid Use Disorder—
and Its Treatment, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1393-94 (2014). 
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these activities and services.34  
The chilling effect and resultant social stagnation can have a practical impact on 
the maintenance of stable recovery.  The Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA) has articulated four key dimensions that 
support recovery:  health, home, purpose, and community.35  Two of these 
dimensions fall directly under the protection of federal civil rights legislation.  The 
right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of disability in housing, or “home,” 
is protected by the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA).36  Purpose, defined as “having 
the independence, income, and resources to participate in society,”37 is protected by 
Titles I and II of the ADA.38  If those protections are explicitly withheld from 
individuals experiencing the symptoms of their disability, the foundations of stable 
recovery are subject to the unaccountable whims of employers or landlords.39 
A. What Does “Currently Engaging” Mean? 
One useful signifier of the damage of the “current use exception” is the way in 
which courts have construed the phrase “currently engaging.”40  The phrase itself has 
no coherent or uniform definition.  Nor is there a bright line rule that separates a 
current user from a qualified individual.  As a result, courts tasked with defining the 
phrase on a case-by-case basis are in disarray.41  Each circuit seems to be guided only 
by the desire to define the phrase more broadly than the rest.42  
In the employment context, where the vast majority of these cases occur, the 
                                                                                                     
 34.  See id.  
 35.  Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs. Admin., Find Treatment, Recovery and Recovery 
Support (last updated Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.samhsa.gov/find-help/recovery 
[https://perma.cc/4XLE-E4MR] [hereinafter SAMHSA]. They are:  
1. Health—overcoming or managing one’s disease(s) or symptoms and making informed, 
healthy choices that support physical and emotional well-being. 
2. Home—having a stable and safe place to live. 
3. Purpose—conducting meaningful daily activities and having the independence, income, 
and resources to participate in society. 
4. Community—having relationships and social networks that provide support, friendship, 
love, and hope. 
 36.  42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1968). 
 37.  SAMHSA, supra note 35. 
 38.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-34 (2009).  
 39.  See, e.g., André Q.C. Miguel et al., Change in Employment Status and Cocaine Use Treatment 
Outcomes: A Secondary Analysis Across Six Clinical Trials, 106 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 89 
(2019) (finding that treatment outcomes for individuals who were addicted to cocaine were 
“significantly better for those employed versus unemployed at the end-of-treatment”); Marika Augutis et 
al., The Meaning of Work: Perceptions of Employed Persons Attending Maintenance Treatment for 
Opiate Addiction, 16 J. SOC. WORK PRACT. IN THE ADDICTIONS 385 (2016) (surveying 32 individuals 
with OUD and finding unanimous belief that work is an “indispensable tool for staying drug-free.”). 
 40.  See § 12114. 
 41.  See, e.g., Mauerhan v. Wagner Corp., 649 F.3d 1180, 1188 (10th Cir. 2011) (“an individual's 
eligibility for the safe harbor must be determined on a case-by-case basis, examining whether the 
circumstances of the plaintiff's drug use and recovery justify a reasonable belief that drug use is no 
longer a problem.”). 
 42.  See infra Part II(A). 
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EEOC has articulated the standard to guide the “current use” analysis.43  In this 
analysis the court does not listen to the employee or the expert opinion of a medical 
professional.44  Rather, the court looks to whether the use was recent enough to 
“justify the employer’s reasonable belief that the employee’s involvement with drugs 
is an ongoing problem.”45  
This framework highlights two fundamental issues with the “current use 
exception.”  First, it accepts as a given that the employer discriminated against the 
employee on the basis of his or her disability.  The employer needs only to have 
reasonably believed that the person was not in sufficiently stable recovery.  Second, 
it requires courts to make medical determinations.  The firmness or stability of one’s 
recovery is a deeply fact-intensive question.  It can involve psychological analysis,46 
physical assessment,47 even a chemical analysis of the individual’s brain.48  The 
question is not whether the employee was adequately performing the essential 
functions of the job.  Rather, the EEOC guides the courts to ask the employer whether 
the employee’s recovery was advanced enough that relapse was no longer a risk.49  
Plaintiffs who faced discrimination in the workplace regularly suffer the same 
indignities before courts, expressed through their archaic articulations of the 
definition of recovery.50  Despite the many hurdles and pitfalls facing plaintiffs in 
employment cases, there is little nuance once a judge feels that the defendant had a 
reasonable belief that the plaintiff was still using, or would use again.51  Whether a 
person is a week sober or seven months sober, if the employer fears relapse, judges 
overwhelmingly defer to their concerns.52  The bluntness with which judges discuss 
this subject may be best exemplified by one federal district court in Indiana:  “The 
point is that it is perfectly permissible for an entity—an employer, a public housing 
authority, etc.—to take an adverse action against someone who is caught using 
                                                                                                     
 43.  See EEOC Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 20; Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. 
Co., 951 F.2d 511, 520 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Suarez v. Pa. Hosp. of Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., 2018 WL 6249711, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 
2018) (citing EEOC Technical Assistance Manual § 8.3).  These cases are most often decided on 
summary judgment. If the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the 
EEOC’s standard seems to muddy the waters. 
 46.  See Ed Stevens et al., Investigating Social Support and Network Relationships in Substance Use 
Disorder Recovery, 36 SUBSTANCE ABUSE 396, 397 (2015) (discussing “key psychological constructs 
related to substance use disorder recovery.”). 
 47.  See Marsha E. Bates et al., Short Term Neuropsychological Recovery in Substance Use 
Disordered, 29 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RSCH. 367, 368 (2005) (discussing the 
physical health improvements which are observable during recovery). 
 48.  See generally Gail Winger et al., Behavioral Perspectives on the Neuroscience of Drug 
Addiction, 84 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 667 (2005) (discussing the stages of neurochemical 
change during early recovery). 
 49.  See EEOC Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 20; see also Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare 
Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 858 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 50.  See infra Part II. 
 51.  For a more in-depth discussion of the difficulty of winning employment discrimination cases, 
see, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 
555, 556 (2001).  
 52.  See infra Part II. 
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drugs.”53 
II. SURVEY OF THE LAW 
The ADA is divided into five titles.54  However, the first three have the broadest 
impact.  Title I protects qualified individuals with disabilities from discrimination in 
employment.55  Title II prevents public—or governmental—entities from 
discriminating on the basis of disability in the provision of services, programs, or 
activities.56  Title III prevents public accommodations, or private entities which open 
themselves up to the public, from discriminating on the basis of disability in the 
provision of “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations.”57  Each title generally follows the same set of 
definitions. Thus, each has an implicit “current use exception.”58  This article 
primarily focuses on Titles I and II of the ADA and the Fair Housing Act.59  These 
specific provisions are the battle grounds for the enforcement and protections of the 
civil rights of individuals with substance use disorders.  The rights at issue under 
these statutes are essential to the maintenance of sustained and healthy recovery.60  
As such, the categorical denial of protections for those rights must be understood and 
reckoned with. 
The confusion over how long an individual must remain abstinent before a court 
will validate his or her recovery lies within nearly every stage of the analysis.  For 
example, courts largely agree that the most logical point to start counting the time 
for plaintiff’s period of abstinence is at his or her most recent use.61  However, courts 
vary on when to stop the clock.62  In Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., the 
Fifth Circuit held that the clock stops upon the employee’s notification of the adverse 
                                                                                                     
 53.  A.B. ex rel. Kehoe v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, No. 3:11 CV 163 PPS, 2012 WL 1877740, at *4 
(N.D. Ind. May 18, 2012), aff'd sub nom. A.B. ex rel., 498 F. App'x 620 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 54.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. 
 55.  Id. §§ 12111-12117. 
 56.  Id. §§ 12131-12165. 
 57.  Id. § 12182. 
 58.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12210(c) (2018). 
 59.  The bulk of case law involving the “current use exception” falls under Title I.  However, Title 
II has also seen litigation revolving around the exception. See infra Part II(B).  This article does not 
reach Titles III-V as they have been used in little to no relevant litigation. 
 60.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 61.  See, e.g., Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 62.  Compare Id. (“we think the relevant time for assessment of Teahan's ‘current’ status is the time 
of his actual firing.”), and Dauen v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs of City of Sterling, 656 N.E.2d 427, 
431 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1995), with Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 855-56 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (holding the relevant time is when the employer notifies the individual that they are to be 
terminated, rather than the actual date of termination), Grimes v. U.S. Postal Serv., 872 F. Supp. 668, 
674-75 (W.D. Mo. 1994), aff'd, 74 F.3d 1243 (8th Cir. 1996) (same), and Figueroa v. Fajardo, 1 F. 
Supp. 2d 117, 121 (D.P.R. 1998) (same).  The claim in Teahan was discrimination on the basis of 
“handicap” brought under the Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §701 et seq.  
However, The ADA and Rehabilitation Act are analyzed using the same standards.  Tyndall v. National 
Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994) (“the ADA expressly requires its provisions to be 
interpreted in a way that ‘prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards for the same 
requirements’ under the two statutes”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b)). 
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employment action.63  Thus, the measurement of the employee’s period of abstinence 
is frozen in that moment.  Under the Fifth Circuit’s logic, if a person comes forward 
to an employer or landlord stating a desire to enter recovery, and the employer or 
landlord threatens adverse action, that is sufficient to close off the chance for 
recovery as a defense against discrimination.64  Whether the employer or landlord 
goes through with the adverse action at that moment is immaterial.  This stands in 
direct contrast to the Second Circuit’s holding in Teahan v. Metro-North. Commuter 
Railroad Co., in which the court held that the correct time to stop the clock is at the 
moment of termination.65  The Zenor court acknowledged the Second Circuit’s 
concern that its notification rule could “expose recovering substance abusers to 
retroactive punishment.”66  Rather than engage with those concerns, the Fifth Circuit 
simply waived them away.67  
The Fifth Circuit, and the subsequent courts which have adopted its reasoning, 
avoid substantive textual analysis in their reading.  The statute is clear that the 
definition of “qualified individual with a disability” should include someone who 
“has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no 
longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated 
successfully and is no longer engaging in such use,” or “is participating in a 
supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use.”68 
It is difficult to square the Fifth Circuit’s decision with the text of the ADA.  The 
court’s analysis allows employers, landlords, or public entities even more latitude 
for adverse action, such that they can retroactively discriminate against someone 
after they have participated in a rehabilitation program.69  Though this reading may 
be inconsistent with the text, its breadth is perfectly in line with the trends in current 
case law.70 
The dozens of cases defining and applying the “current use exception” are often 
vastly disparate in their logic.  However, judges, left with vague guidance, have 
applied an almost uniformly broad construction, thus achieving consistent results.71  
The tests articulated within the early foundational appellate court opinions, which 
define “current use,” are nebulous and deferential to the biases of the trial judges.72  
Functionally, these tests create more ambiguities than they eliminate.73  As discussed 
below, the information highlighted as central to the “current use” analysis under 
                                                                                                     
 63.  Zenor, 176 F.3d at 856.  This logic need not be limited to employment law.  See infra Parts 
II(B)-(C). 
 64.  Zenor, 176 F.3d at 856. 
 65.  Teahan, 951 F.2d at 520.   
 66.  Zenor, 176 F.3d at 854.  
 67.  See id. at 855-56. 
 68.  42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(1)-(2) (2009). 
 69.  See Zenor, 176 F.3d at 854. 
 70.  See, e.g., Mauerhan v. Wagner Corp., 649 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 2011); Shirley v. 
Precision Castparts Corp., 726 F.3d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 71.  Zsoldos v. Twp. of Manchester, No. 3:16-cv-2711-BRM-TJB, 2017 WL 77412, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 9, 2017) (stating that the ADA and its implementing regulations “instruct[] courts to interpret 
‘currently engaging’ broadly rather than narrowly.”) (citing 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, app. § 1630.3(a)-(c)). 
See also infra Parts II(A)-(C).  
 72.  See, e.g., Shafer v. Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1997) (defining 
“currently” as “a periodic or ongoing activity . . . that has not yet permanently ended”). 
 73.  See infra Part II(A)(1). 
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these various tests often misses the core of what it means to be in recovery, favoring 
length of time sober above all else.  This poorly targeted analytical scrutiny is 
emblematic of the exception’s fundamental issue:  it empowers judges alone to 
decide whether the plaintiff’s recovery is stable enough to earn his or her civil rights.  
A. “Current Use” Under Title I of the ADA 
Claims of discrimination under Title I of the ADA are analyzed through the 
burden-shifting framework articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green.74  The process breaks down into three steps.  First, the plaintiff must 
make out a prima facie case of discrimination.75  To do so, a plaintiff must prove 
three things:  (1) that she has a disability; (2) that she can perform the essential 
functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) her 
employer discriminated against her on the basis of that disability.76  Once the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to “articulate a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.”77  Finally, the burden shifts back 
to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated 
reason was actually pretext for discrimination.78  A successful claim must navigate 
this multi-layered and multi-step analytical framework just to get to a jury.  As a 
result, many of these cases are dismissed before trial, heard only by a single judge.79 
A more subtle, yet dangerous, substance use-specific distinction in the ADA is 
the provision distinguishing the disability itself from conduct related to the 
disability.80  Excepting substance use disorders, “the ADA protects both the 
disability and the conduct caused by the disability.”81  However, section 12114(c) 
allows an employer to hold an employee with a substance use disorder to the same 
qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior standards 
that are applied to other employees.82  This is a categorical revocation of an essential 
ADA protection as “[e]mployers may respond to addiction-related misconduct in a 
way that they cannot respond to other disability-related misconduct,” even if the 
                                                                                                     
 74.  Suarez v. Pa. Hosp. of Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., No. 18-1596, 2018 WL 6249711, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 29, 2018) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). 
 75.  Id. at *5. 
 76.  Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 941 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1996).  This is the 
step where most plaintiffs come up against the current use exception. See, e.g., id. 
 77.  Suarez, 2018 WL 6249711, at *5. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See, e.g., id. 
 80.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2009) (stating that an employer “may hold an employee who 
engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for 
employment or job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any 
unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee”).  
 81.  Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 609 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 82.  See EMP. DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR, ANALYSIS OF FED. L., LIMITED PROTECTIONS FOR 
ILLEGAL DRUG USERS AND ALCOHOL ABUSERS UNDER THE ADA (1 Emp. Discrimination Coordinator 
Analysis of Fed. L., § 6:40 2020); see also Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 319 n.14 (5th Cir. 
1997) (stating that the “ADA places employers under no obligation to accommodate misconduct that is 
product of employee's alcoholism . . . employers [may] hold alcoholic employees to same standard of 
conduct as nonalcoholic employees”). 
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misconduct is related directly to the substance use disorder.83  
As stated by the Tenth Circuit, “the disability v. disability-caused conduct 
dichotomy seems to be unique to alcoholism and drugs.”84  Put simply, when dealing 
with substance use disorders, “the ADA and Rehabilitation Act draw a distinction 
between ‘having a disability’ and ‘disability-caused misconduct.’”85  That distinction 
opens doors for employers to act on the basis of drug use, even if such use happened 
months ago, and was due to the compulsion associated with the effects that the 
substance use disorder may have had on the brain.86  The unique distinction dividing 
substance use disorders and behaviors associated with them—such as relapse—is 
further proof that substance use disorders still carry the stigma of moral failure, even 
in the eyes of the ADA.87  
1. Circuit Courts Defining the Boundaries of “Current Use” Under the ADA 
Not many circuit courts have taken up the “current use” issue.  However, there 
are several cases which directly address the viability of specific lengths of 
abstinence.  None paints a rosy picture for an individual hoping to vindicate his or 
her rights.  Some circuits have made passing references to the inadequacy of a 
specific length of time in dicta.88  More still write approvingly of the foundational 
cases that rule directly on specific periods of time without making a strict ruling of 
their own.  District courts in circuits without any controlling precedent frequently 
rely heavily on the lengthy abstinence requirements from these early cases, despite 
their age and hyper-narrow focus on the weeks or months that the plaintiff was 
abstinent.89  The logical foundations for each case are useful for understanding how 
                                                                                                     
 83.  EMP. DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR, supra note 82.  Alcohol use disorder, or alcoholism as 
listed in the statute, and illegal substances are treated equally in this context. See § 12114(c)(4).  
 84.  Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad. 129 F.3d 1076, 1086, 1085-88 (10th Cir. 1997).  But see 
Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 941 F. Supp. 721, 726 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (noting that the Second 
Circuit “rejects the sharp distinction between a handicapping condition on the one hand, and specific 
behavior on the other”) (quoting Hogarth v. Thornburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 85.  Dennis v. Fitzsimons, No. 18-CV-0128, 2019 WL 4201476, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2019). 
 86.  See Baustian v. Louisiana, 910 F. Supp. 274, 276 (E.D. La. 1995) (holding that being drug free 
and participating in a rehabilitation program is insufficient to qualify as an individual with a disability); 
see also Matthews, 941 F. Supp. at 726 (“According to the Second Circuit, proof that the employer fired 
the plaintiff because of absences caused by his disability constituted evidence that the employer 
terminated him because of his disability.”). 
 87.  See Dovenmuehler v. St. Cloud Hosp., 509 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a nurse 
with a substance use disorder was not a qualified individual with a disability because the ADA did not 
protect her from the “consequences of illicit conduct explainable by her chemical dependence, such as 
diverting hospital drugs intended for patients to personal use”); Salley v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 
977, 981 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that no jury could find that the plaintiff was fired for his drug addiction 
rather than misconduct, whether or not the misconduct was caused by addiction); Maddox v. Univ. of 
Tenn., 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that “it strains logic to conclude that [workplace 
misconduct] could be protected under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA merely because the actor has 
been diagnosed as an alcoholic and claims that such action was caused by his disability.”); Collings v. 
Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the discharge of employees for drug-
related misconduct in the workplace). 
 88.  See, e.g., Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 150 F. App'x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 89.  See infra Part II(A)(2).  Of the directly relevant circuit cases, there are only two cases from this 
millennium. See generally Mauerhan, 649 F.3d 1180; Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1186 
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district court cases have applied the “current use exception,” despite the lack of a 
coherent definition or standard. 
There are four particularly definitive—and thus, influential—cases which draw 
basic bright line rules declaring specific stretches of abstinence insufficient to qualify 
for the ADA’s safe harbor.90  Each of these cases explains that “current use” extends 
beyond the “weeks and months” prior to the adverse action—participation or 
completion of a rehabilitation program notwithstanding.91  These cases have come 
to define the “current use” analysis and have been relied on by a significant number 
of other trial and appellate courts.92  
Chronologically, the first appellate case to definitively declare a length of 
abstinence insufficient is Shafer v. Preston Memorial Hospital Corp.93  The Shafer 
court faced the “current use exception” with some informative precedent from within 
its circuit in the housing context.94  Despite the United States v. Southern 
Management ruling determining that individuals who had been drug-free for one 
year were not “current users” under the FHA, the Shafer court took a different 
approach under the ADA.95  The court distinguished Southern Management, noting 
that it had only provided that abstinence for a year was sufficient for the safe harbor.96  
However, it reasoned that no precedent established that being drug-free for less than 
a year at the time of termination provides similar protection.97  To make its 
determination, the court defined “currently” under the statute as “a periodic or 
ongoing activity in which a person engages (even if doing something else at the 
precise moment) that has not yet permanently ended.”98  Shafer herself had been 
participating in a drug rehabilitation program and abstinent from drug use for roughly 
a month at the time of her final termination.99  Accordingly, the court determined 
that “an employee illegally using drugs in a periodic fashion during the weeks and 
                                                                                                     
(9th Cir. 2001); see also Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., 726 F.3d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting 
in dicta that the safe harbor only applies to “individuals who have been drug-free for a significant period 
of time,” but not determining how long that needs to be) (quoting Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., 
Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 857 (5th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotations omitted); Brown, 246 F.3d at 1186 (noting 
that “the ‘safe harbor’ provision applies only to employees who have refrained from using drugs for a 
significant period of time”).  Further, the bulk of these foundational cases were decided before the ADA 
Amendments Act, which expanded eligibility as a qualified individual with a disability and excoriated 
the courts for their exclusionary readings of the ADA.  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, § 2(a)(6), 122 Stat. 3553 (restoring the intent and protections of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, stating that “courts have incorrectly found . . .  that people with a range of 
substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities”). 
 90.  See Collings, 63 F.3d at 833 (creating the “weeks and months” metric); see also Shafer v. 
Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 1997); Zenor, 176 F.3d at 858; Mauerhan, 649 
F.3d at 1186-87. 
 91.  See, e.g., Shafer, 107 F.3d at 277. 
 92.  See, e.g., Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., 726 F.3d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 2013); see also infra 
Part II(A)(2). 
 93.  Shafer, 107 F.3d 274. 
 94.  See United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 921 (4th Cir.1992). 
 95.  Id. at 919–23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96.  Shafer, 107 F.3d at 277, n.4. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 278. 
 99.  Id. at 275. 
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months prior to discharge” remained a “current user.”100  Shafer was not the first 
decision to use “weeks and months” as a floor for the required length of 
abstinence.101  However, it was the first case to apply that metric against a specific 
length of time. 
The next foundational “current use” circuit case is Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare 
System, Ltd.102  The Fifth Circuit has played a central role in setting the standards for 
interpreting the exception.103  Zenor involved a plaintiff who had five weeks of 
sustained abstinence, had completed the residential portion of his treatment program, 
and had self-reported his addiction to his employer.104  The Zenor court was not 
persuaded by the plaintiff’s period of abstinence and held that it was insufficient for 
protection.105   
Somewhat recently the Fifth Circuit addressed the exception again, this time in 
Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp.106  In Shirley, the court reaffirmed that an 
individual could only qualify for the safe harbor after “weeks, or even months” of 
sustained abstinence.107  Furthermore, the court seemed to narrow the viability of 
using one’s participation in rehab as proof that they are no longer a “current user.”108  
Together, the Zenor and Shirley courts’ interpretations of the statutory language 
surrounding “current use” do considerable damage to plaintiffs trying to vindicate 
their rights as individuals with disabilities. 
A slightly less-cited—though equally definitive holding—comes from the Ninth 
Circuit in Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc.109  Brown, a grocery store clerk, was arrested 
                                                                                                     
 100.  Id. at 278.  The court’s dismissal of the argument for a narrow construction of the “current use 
exception” is particularly telling.  The court opined that such a construction meant, “an employee testing 
positive for drugs on Monday would not be ‘currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs’ under the 
statutes despite the fact that his positive test resulted from weekend drug use.” Id.  It declared such a 
result to be “‘inconsistent with [public] policy and abhorrent to the sense of justice.’” Id. (quoting 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 449 (1932)). 
 101.  See Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 102.  Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 103.  According to Westlaw, the Zenor court’s pronouncements on the definition of current have 
been cited over 20 times across the circuits, including by district courts with controlling precedent from 
their own circuit courts.  See, e.g., Lyons v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., No. CCB-15-0232, 2016 WL 
7188441, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2016) (citing to the Zenor court’s definition of “current"); Torello v. 
Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., No. 3:04CV848(WWE), 2006 WL 680508, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 14, 2006) 
(same). 
 104.  Zenor, 176 F.3d at 857. 
 105.  Id. at 858. 
 106.  Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., 726 F.3d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 107.  Id. at 679 n.11. 
 108.  See id. at 680. The relevant passage reads, “many people continue to participate in drug 
treatment programs long after they have stopped using drugs illegally, and that such persons should be 
protected under the Act.” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-596H, at 64 (1990) (Conf. Rep.)) (emphasis 
added).  The court’s use of this excerpt from the ADA’s legislative history suggests that participation in 
rehab is unpersuasive without proof of abstinence for “a significant period of time.” Id. (citation 
omitted).  This assertion marks another significant departure from the plain meaning of the text, which 
explicitly protects individuals who are “participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and [are] no 
longer engaging in [illegal drug] use.” 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(2) (2009).  Unsurprisingly, there does not 
appear to be any case law denying summary judgment to an employer sued by a person who faced an 
adverse employment action while in, or recently following, the release from a rehabilitation program. 
 109.  Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001).   
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for driving under the influence and possession of methamphetamine.110  As a result, 
Brown faced a short period of incarceration and “was required to attend round-the-
clock rehabilitation.”111  Her arrest and rehab caused her to miss several days of work 
and she was subsequently fired.112  The court found that her six days of abstinence 
were not “a sufficient length of time” to qualify for the safe harbor.113  In so doing, 
the court announced a new test to determine whether to apply the safe harbor.114  A 
person qualifies as disabled under the ADA only if he or she has “refrained from 
using drugs for a significant period of time.”115  The Ninth Circuit has not clarified 
the definition of “significant” beyond holding that a six-day period does not meet the 
requirement. 
Finally, the most recent case to take a firm—though slightly more wavering—
stance is Mauerhan v. Wagner Corp.116  In Mauerhan, the plaintiff was fired for 
testing positive on a drug test.117  Wagner, his employer, offered to rehire Mauerhan 
if he “could get clean.”118  Following the successful completion of a month-long 
inpatient rehab program Mauerhan requested to return to work.119  He was offered a 
job but with cuts to his salary and diminished responsibilities.120  He refused and 
brought a discrimination claim under the ADA.121  Mauerhan appealed his loss on 
summary judgment, arguing in part that his status as a “current user” or qualified 
individual is dependent on a question of fact.122  Had the court agreed, Mauerhan’s 
claim could have gone to a trial with a full presentation of medical evidence and 
expert opinion.  Neither the district court nor the Tenth Circuit agreed.  Rather, the 
appellate court found that a record devoid of any substantive input from medical 
professionals was adequate to determine that Mauerhan was insufficiently sober to 
gain recognition as a person worthy of the ADA’s protection.123  
Though the above cases are arguably the most decisive on the matter, other 
circuits have addressed current use in dicta.124  Some court have taken the frustrating 
path of announcing interpretive standards and tests but dodged a definitive ruling on 
a length of time.125   
Ultimately, the foundational cases discussed above create three basic categories 
                                                                                                     
 110.  Id. at 1186. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 1188. 
 114.  Id. at 1186 
 115.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 116.  Mauerhan v. Wagner Corp., 649 F.3d 1180, 1180 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 117.  Id. at 1183. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 1185. The district court disagreed, holding that one month was an insufficient period of 
time as a matter of law. Id. at 1185-86.  Mauerhan’s argument was not novel—the Second Circuit held 
that one’s status as a current user is a question of fact under the Rehabilitation Act. See Teahan v. 
Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 520 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 123.  Id. at 1189. 
 124.  See, e.g., Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 150 F. App'x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating in dicta 
that three weeks was not a long enough period of abstinence to qualify for the safe harbor). 
 125.  See, e.g., Mauerhan, 649 F.3d at 1186. 
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of “current use” tests.  The first test is whether “the drug use was sufficiently recent 
to justify the employer's reasonable belief that the drug abuse remained an ongoing 
problem.”126  Next is the “periodic or ongoing activity” test employed by the Fourth 
Circuit.127  This test requires a reasonable belief that the plaintiff’s active use “has 
not yet permanently ended.”128  The third and final test comes from the Ninth Circuit, 
which applies the safe harbor “only to employees who have refrained from using 
drugs for a significant period of time.”129  The three tests do not materially differ in 
how little clarity they provide.  Rather, they are all different ways of saying the same 
thing:  courts require extraordinary evidence to find that someone is stable enough 
in their recovery to merit protection, but virtually no evidence to definitively 
determine otherwise. 
The culmination of appellate case law, though in short supply, reveals some 
basic assumptions one can make when evaluating a judicially acceptable period of 
abstinence.  First, as the Fourth Circuit has declared in the FHA context—and which 
other courts have generally accepted in the ADA context—one year of abstinence is 
a sufficiently long time for safe harbor protection.130  Employees in the early stages 
of recovery are far from guaranteed protections under the ADA.  Furthermore, trial 
courts are left with an enormous range between the boundaries of what absolutely 
qualifies for the safe harbor and what absolutely designates someone a “current 
user.”  The closest one can come to a definitive statement on those boundaries is that 
six days is too short,131 and one year is long enough.132  Anything else is almost 
entirely at the discretion of how much evidence a trial judge is willing to consider at 
the summary judgment phase. 
2. District Courts Applying the “Current Use Exception” 
Despite the greater availability of relevant case law, the vague standards and 
boundaries set by the circuit courts have yielded equally murky results at the trial 
level.  District courts have been given few guidelines and nearly boundless authority 
to decide what is and is not sufficiently stable recovery as a matter of law.  With that 
authority, trial judges have run the gamut of stigma-informed factual conclusions 
                                                                                                     
 126.   Mauerhan, 649 F.3d at 1187; see, e.g., A.B. ex rel. Kehoe v. Hous. Auth. of South. Bend, 498 
F. App'x 620, 622 (7th Cir. 2012); Greer v. Cleveland Clinic Health Sys.-E. Region, 503 F. App'x 422, 
431 (6th Cir. 2012); Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 856 (5th Cir. 1999); see also 
Teahan, 951 F.2d at 520 (stating that the test is “whether the employee's substance abuse problem is 
severe and recent enough so that the employer is justified in believing that the employee is unable to 
perform the essential duties of his job.”). 
 127.  Shafer v. Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 128.  Id.  This may be the most problematic test of the three.  It asks the trial judge to step into the 
shoes of a clinician and assess the sustainability of an individual’s recovery.  Perplexingly, the Shafer 
court’s own analysis would suggest that to make that assessment the trial judge need only consider the 
length of the individual’s abstinence thus far.  See id. 
 129.  Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001).   
 130.  United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 921 (4th Cir.1992) (FHA); Kehoe, 2012 WL 
1877740, at *5 (holding that defendant’s admitted cocaine use three weeks prior excluded her from safe 
harbor provision protections).  
 131.  Brown, 246 F.3d at 1188. 
 132.  S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d at 921. 
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presented in the language of legal determinations.133  This section will survey the 
district court decisions applying the vague tests articulated by the various circuit 
courts.134  The lack of a coherent set of standards which could help individuals 
advance beyond the summary judgment phase is obvious and alarming. 
The most blatantly stigma-informed cases come from districts in New Jersey 
and Louisiana:  Smith v. Eastman Kodak Co.135 and Lejeune v. Omni Energy 
Services. Corp.136  In both cases the courts held that individuals with roughly six 
months of sustained abstinence were still “current users” for the purposes of the 
ADA.  Neither decision relies on medical evidence that supports the conclusion that 
the plaintiffs were unstable in their sobriety.  Rather, the Smith court relied on the 
plaintiff’s six months of abstinence and post-termination relapse to determine that he 
was currently using at the time he was fired.137  Though methodologically 
inadequate, the Smith court can still be said to have provided an analysis to support 
its judgment.  The Lejeune court was less forthcoming.  
In Lejeune, the court laid out the barest possible factual pre-requisites to make a 
legal conclusion on the plaintiff’s abstinence.  It began with the plaintiff’s cessation 
of illegal drug use on July 31, 2007, and concluded with his subsequent treatment 
for his opioid use disorder.138  The court then explained that the plaintiff remained in 
treatment at the time of his firing on January 22, 2008.139  Immediately thereafter, 
and without any other analysis or explanation, the court asserted that “his drug use 
is characterized as ‘current’” and therefore he was “precluded from being a qualified 
person with a disability.”140  The court provided no further justification for its 
conclusions and granted summary judgment to the employer.141  Smith and Lejeune 
stand out both for their bafflingly broad interpretation of the word “current” and their 
near complete lack of legal analysis justifying their conclusions.  However, their 
inattention to medical evidence or expert opinion and their singular focus on the 
length of abstinence is representative of the general treatment of individuals in the 
early stages of recovery by courts.   
Most cases are not as egregious in their consideration of timeframe or analytical 
dishonesty as Smith or Lejeune.  However, the majority of courts do follow Smith 
                                                                                                     
 133.  See, e.g., Lejeune v. Omni Energy Servs. Corp., No. 6:09-CV-0194, 2010 WL 378305(W.D. 
La. Jan. 29, 2010); Smith v. Eastman Kodak Co., No.95-4677, 1999 WL 33327051 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 
1999). 
 134.  This section will exclude cases finding that the individual never attempted recovery.  Despite 
the article’s ultimate assertion that the “current use exception” is problematic to any individual at any 
stage of their substance use disorder, there are too many instances of uninterrupted use to survey here. 
 135.  Smith, 1999 WL 33327051, at *4 (“Plaintiff admits to having used drugs within six months of 
his termination, a period which was ‘sufficiently recent to justify [Kodak's] reasonable belief that it was 
an ongoing problem rather than a problem that was in the past.’”) (quoting Wormley v. Arkla, Inc., 871 
F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (E.D. Ark. 1994)). 
 136.  Lejeune, 2010 WL 378305, at *9 (holding that six months of sustained sobriety was insufficient 
to qualify for the safe harbor.). 
 137.  Smith, 1999 WL 33327051, at *4. 
 138.  Lejeune, 2010 WL 378305, at *9. Plaintiff’s treatment consisted of both doctor-prescribed and 
monitored suboxone, and participation in an outpatient treatment program.  Id.  
 139.  Id.  The court noted that the plaintiff remained in treatment at least up to the time of his 
deposition for the case at bar.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
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and Lejeune into the same methodological pitfalls by relying, above all else, on the 
length of time that the plaintiff was abstinent from drugs directly preceding the 
adverse employment action.142  There are, however, outliers.  For example, the 
court’s reasoning in Scott v. Beverly Enterprises-Kansas, Inc. relies on facts beyond 
weeks and months, but simultaneously reveals a more stigma-informed logic.143  The 
court found that a one-month period of abstinence was mooted by the fact that the 
plaintiff had relapsed after he was fired.144  Not only does this ignore the nature of 
substance use disorders as chronic relapsing brain diseases, which are 
symptomatically responsive to the material conditions of one’s life, it also grossly 
misinterprets the case law.  The relevant time to determine whether someone is a 
current user for the purposes of the employment action is either at the time of the 
adverse action or when the employee is notified of the employer’s intent to act.145  
Even partial reliance on the plaintiff’s post-termination relapse is a complete 
deviation from precedent. 
Undoubtedly, the weight of the case law favors employers.  However, there are 
several examples of district courts straying from the pack.  The diversions from the 
normal course of granting the defendants’ judgment as a matter of law on the “current 
use exception” usually come in one of two forms.  First, some courts refuse to rule 
as a matter of law that a specific length of time is insufficient to qualify for the safe 
harbor.146  These rulings, while helpful, are not a guarantee that the case will go to 
trial.  The second, and more common, form involves plaintiffs with longer periods 
of abstinence.147  However unfaithful to the science of substance use disorders as it 
                                                                                                     
 142.  See, e.g., Lyons v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., No. CCB-15-0232, 2016 WL 7188441, at *4 (D. Md. 
Dec. 12, 2016), aff'd as modified, 712 F. App'x 287 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Shafer v. Preston Mem'l 
Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 1997)) (“Four months is not such a lengthy period that Mr. 
Lyons cannot qualify as a current user.”); Quigley v. Austeel Lemont Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that plaintiff's in-patient recovery program lasting for ten days and being drug 
free for a total period of one month before employee was terminated did not qualify for the safe-harbor); 
Baustian v. Louisiana, 910 F. Supp. 274, 276 (E.D. La. 1995) (holding that seven weeks of sustained 
sobriety was insufficient to qualify for the safe harbor ); McDaniel v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr., 877 F. 
Supp. 321, 327-28 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (holding that six weeks of sustained sobriety was insufficient to 
qualify for the safe harbor); Wormley v. Arkla, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1079, 1080 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (firing 
an employee the day he was released from his rehabilitation program after roughly one month of 
abstinence). 
 143.  Scott v. Beverly Enters. Kan., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1430, 1440 (D. Kan. 1997) (“The undisputed 
evidence is that plaintiff periodically abused drugs during the weeks, months and years before and after 
his termination.”). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See, e.g., Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating 
that the relevant period for the calculation of the length of abstinence ends upon the employee’s actual 
termination); Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 855-56 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
the relevant time for the calculation ends upon the employee’s notice of termination). 
 146.  See, e.g., Suarez v. Pa. Hosp. of Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., No. 18-1596, 2018 WL 6249711, at 
*6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2018) (holding that the determination of the plaintiff’s status as a current user is a 
question of fact for the jury); Hoffman v. MCI WorldCom Commc'ns, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 
(D. Conn. 2001) (“[A] month of abstinence while in a supervised rehabilitation program may qualify 
Hoffman for protection under the ADA . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 147.  See Herman v. City of Allentown, 985 F. Supp. 569, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a nine-
month abstinence was not current use). See also Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 759-60, 
765, 767 (D. Kan. 1988) (holding it was a violation of the Rehabilitation Act to refuse to hire a 
registered nurse who was in recovery and was otherwise qualified for an ICU position when she had 
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may be, there is a simple maxim favored by courts:  the longer you are sober, the 
more stable you are in your recovery.148  
A dramatically long period of abstinence that is denied safe harbor protection is 
not the only example of courts’ failure to recognize substance use disorders as 
medical conditions.  For example, Suarez v. Pennsylvania Hospital of University of 
Pennsylvania Health System provides a useful juxtaposition between an analysis that 
considers medical opinion versus a purely judicial construction of recovery.149  
Suarez was a registered nurse in recovery.150  Despite her diagnosed opioid use 
disorder, she was prescribed oxycodone—a powerfully addictive pain killer and 
opioid—to treat her chronic back pain.151  After more than three years of sustained 
abstinence, she relapsed.152  Suarez eventually entered into, and subsequently 
completed, a month-long inpatient rehab program.153  She was released with the 
program’s recommendation that she return to work after a two-week transition 
period.154  She was terminated roughly six months later for failure to agree to a 
reassignment.155  On these facts, the court denied summary judgment to the hospital 
after relying heavily on the rehabilitation clinic’s assessment of the stability of her 
recovery.156  The court highlighted the short turn-over time between her admittance 
to the clinic and the clinic’s recommendation that she return to work.157  
The Suarez court stands out as uniquely receptive to medical opinion.  The 
frequent citation to the clinic’s evaluation that the plaintiff was ready to return to 
work in a clinical setting underscores why deference to medical opinion is essential.  
It was the medical evidence that moved the court not to dismiss Suarez as a current 
user.158   
Recovery is idiosyncratic and strict adherence to rigid recovery-stage timelines 
                                                                                                     
completed a rehabilitation program, was no longer a current user, had been drug-free for over nine 
months, and had informed her prospective employer of her disability).  But see Kelly v. N. Shore–Long 
Island Jewish Health Sys., 166 F. Supp. 3d 274, 286–87 (E.D. N.Y. 2016) (finding a plausible inference 
of discrimination when an employee who was three months sober was placed on administrative leave 
two hours after she informed her human resources manager and director that she was a recovering 
alcoholic). 
 148.  Though some district courts may not even be convinced by one’s length of abstinence.  See 
Lejeune v. Omni Energy Servs. Corp., No. 6:09-CV-0194, 2010 WL 378305, at *9 (W.D. La. Jan. 29, 
2010); Smith v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 95-4677, 1999 WL 33327051, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 1999). 
 149.  See Suarez, 2018 WL 6249711, at *6.  This case was brought against a state-run university 
hospital, thus would normally fall under Title II.  However, the court does not address under which 
provision of the ADA the case was brought. Further, the court relies, in part, on the EEOC Title I 
guidance and Title I case law, while making no mention of the Department of Justice’s regulations or 
guidance. Id.  Thus, the case is included in the Title I section. 
 150.  Id. at *1. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at *3.  
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at *4–5. 
 156.  Id. at *6.  
 157.  Id.  
 158.  See id. 
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often mischaracterizes where someone may be in the process.159  However, the 
calculus undertaken by the great majority of courts assessing whether someone is 
stable enough in their recovery to work is far too simple.160  Medical opinion is a 
useful tool to guide lawyers and judges, who have no medical knowledge, through 
the individual’s personal stages of recovery.  It is crucial that any determination on 
a person’s stability in their recovery is made with specific details of that recovery in 
mind, rather than simply relying on a number of weeks or months.161  Anything less 
is an implicit determination that substance use disorders are more about choice than 
biology. 
Ultimately, the vast majority of opinions interpreting section 12114 of the ADA 
cite no academic journal, no expert testimony, and no textual—statutory or 
regulatory—requirements for their determinations.  Rather, courts have shown a 
preference for citing to one excerpt from the ADA’s legislative history, which 
appears to support their shockingly, yet uniformly, broad construction of the term 
“currently.”162  With their focus on that single excerpt from the legislative history, 
courts seem to have overlooked another:  “public policy affecting persons with 
disabilities recognize[s] that many of the problems faced by disabled people are not 
inevitable, but instead are the result of unfounded, outmoded stereotypes and 
                                                                                                     
 159.  See Brandon G. Bergman et al., “The Age of Feeling in-Between”: Addressing Challenges in 
the Treatment of Emerging Adults With Substance Use Disorders, 23 COGNITIVE & BEHAV. PRAC. 270, 
270-71 (2016). 
 160.  Cf. Peter J. Cohen, Vigilance and the Drug-dependent Anesthesiologist, 110 ANESTHESIOLOGY 
1422, 1422 (2009) (discussing the Medical Society of the District of Columbia’s Physician Health 
Committee intervention for doctors who become drug-dependent).  Dr. Cohen is careful to mention that 
this is not a one-size-fits-all solution.  Id.  However, if the doctor subject to the intervention participates 
in the recommended rehab program, they are immediately reinstated upon release, though subject to 
slightly more oversight.  Id.  The medical recognition of the complexity and idiosyncrasy of each 
individual’s recovery is an overt rejection of the unfaltering trend in judicial construction and executive 
guidance regarding current use.  
 161.  It seems only fair that judges adopt the spirit of the push against stereotypes that the ADA 
demands of employers, public entities, and public accommodations.  See 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b) (2019) 
(stating that “a public accommodation must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable 
judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence.”). 
 162.  “The provision excluding an individual who engages in the illegal use of drugs from protection 
. . . is not intended to be limited to persons who use drugs on the day of, or within a matter of days or 
weeks before, the employment action in question.  Rather the provision is intended to apply to a person 
whose illegal use of drugs occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person’s drug 
use is current.” H.R. REP. NO. 101–596, at 64 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
565, 573.  This excerpt considers “days or weeks” when discussing the meaning of current use. Id.; cf. 
Shafer v. Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n employee illegally using 
drugs in a periodic fashion during the weeks and months prior to discharge is ‘currently engaging in the 
illegal use of drugs.’”); Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 856 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(“[T]he characterization of ‘currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs’ is properly applied to persons 
who have used illegal drugs in the weeks and months preceding a negative employment action.”) 
(quoting Shafer, 107 F.3d at 278).  Nothing in the statute, regulations, technical assistance, or the 
legislative history uses the word “months.”  Rather, the “weeks and months” language first appears in 
Collings. 63 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding employees’ use in “weeks and months” prior to 
discharge was current use), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1048 (1996); cf. EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
MANUAL § 8.3, supra note 20, (‘“Current’ drug use . . . is not limited to the day of use, or recent weeks 
or days, in terms of an employment action.”) (emphasis added).  It is worth questioning whether the 
dicta buried in an opinion from 1995 should be the defining standard for current use across the country. 
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perceptions, and deeply imbedded prejudices toward people with disabilities.”163  
Given that the latter provision gets to the core societal ill the ADA was meant to 
remedy, courts seem to run afoul of the statute’s mandate nearly every time they 
interpret the “current use exception.” 
B. “Current Use” Under Title II of the ADA 
Current use is litigated far less frequently under Title II than Title I.164  Much of 
the Title II litigation involves public employment, leaving the analysis muddied with 
Title I and the Rehabilitation Act.165  The few cases which expressly acknowledge 
that they come under Title II often rely on Title I precedent.166  Accordingly, the 
vague guidance and emphasis on broad construction has yielded similar results for 
public entities as employers.167  Courts continue to measure recovery purely in days, 
weeks, and months.168  However, public employment is not the only context in which 
the current use exception could be implicated under Title II.  
Individuals in recovery also face potential barriers to programs, services, and 
activities offered by public entities on the basis of their substance use disorder.169  
The most prevalent issue is the denial of rehabilitative services based on current 
use.170  Under Title IV of the ADA, “Miscellaneous Provisions,” and the DOJ’s 
implementing regulations for Title II, no individual may be denied access to “health 
services, or services provided in connection with drug rehabilitation, on the basis of 
the current illegal use of drugs if the individual is otherwise entitled to such 
                                                                                                     
 163.  H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (III), at 25 (1990); cf. Wormley v. Arkla, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 
(E.D. Ark. 1994) (finding “further support” from a case involving a person who relapsed after attending 
a rehabilitation clinic that “entering a rehabilitation program does not immediately convert a ‘current’ 
user into a [sic] individual with a disability protected under the ADA”) (citing Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 
558 (9th Cir.1990)). 
 164.  Though the exception itself does not appear in Title II, “the provision is repeated in the 
‘Miscellaneous Provisions,’ section making it applicable to the entire ADA.” Lopez v. Corr. Med. 
Servs., No. 04-2155 (NLH), 2009 WL 1883915, at *12 (D.N.J. June 30, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Lopez v. 
Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 499 F. App’x 142 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 165.  Dauen v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs of City of Sterling, 656 N.E.2d 427, 492, n.2 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 3d Dist. 1995) (“Although claims of employment discrimination against public entities are properly 
brought under Title II of the ADA, such claims are to be evaluated under the standards set forth in Title 
I of the ADA and in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”) (citing Ethridge v. Alabama, 860 F. Supp. 808 
(M.D. Ala. 1994)); see also D’Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding 
that an employer may not take adverse action against an employee on the basis of a substance use 
disorder if the employee is in recovery and is otherwise qualified for the position). 
 166.  See, e.g., Quinones v. Univ. of P.R., No. 14-1331 (JAG), 2015 WL 631327, at *13 (D.P.R. Feb. 
13, 2015) (relying on the reasoning of Mauerhan, Brown, Shafer, and Zenor). 
 167.  See, supra text accompanying notes 1-11; see also Vedernikov v. W. Va. Univ., 55 F. Supp. 2d 
518, 523 (N.D. W. Va. 1999) (finding that a resident in the state university hospital’s Anesthesiology 
Residency Program was not a current usereven though there was a prognosis of being in “early full 
remission”).  But see Montegue v. City of New Orleans, No. 95.2420, 1996 WL 531830, at *4 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 13, 1996) (stating that “the court ha[d] no reason to believe that [the plaintiff was] not a ‘stable’ 
former drug addict,” because he had completed a certified substance use treatment program “more than 
one year prior to [] request[ing] reinstatement” to his former position).  
 168.  See Quinnones, 2015 WL 631327, at *13. 
 169.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018). 
 170.  See generally AM. JUR. 2D Americans with Disabilities Act § 6 (2020). 
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services.”171  However, a treatment program may expel or otherwise deny continued 
services to “individuals who engage in illegal use of drugs while they are in the 
program.”172  
The denial of rehabilitative services under Title II comes up frequently in the 
prison context.173  However, the nature of people’s presence in jails and prisons 
complicates the “current use” analysis.  Toney v. Goord provides a glaring example 
of this “current use” analysis complication.174  In evaluating whether a prison inmate 
with a long history of substance use was a current user, the court insisted that to 
qualify for the safe harbor the claimant must be “successfully rehabilitated.”175  In 
doing so, the court dismissed the individual’s year of abstinence from intravenous 
heroin and cocaine use as due solely to his incarceration.176  Thus, the court reasoned, 
he was simply an “addict” and could not be categorized as a person in recovery.177  
The court’s insistence on “successful” rehabilitation as a key factor in determining 
an individual’s status as a “current user” is both unfounded in precedent and 
completely contrary to the very next subsection of the statute.178  The court ultimately 
opined that the length of the plaintiff’s forced sobriety due to incarceration did not 
outweigh his multiple relapses as evidence that he was still a current user.179  Under 
that logic, the court dismissed the individual’s denial of a reasonable accommodation 
claim.180  The accommodation at issue was a request for access to a substance use 
treatment program.181 
C. Housing Discrimination Under the FHA, Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA 
Along with the rights and liberties protected by the Rehabilitation Act and the 
ADA, Congress has recognized that housing is an area of significant risk for 
discrimination on the basis of disability.  The FHA declares it unlawful to, among 
other things, refuse to sell or rent to, or evict someone on the basis of their 
                                                                                                     
 171.  42 U.S.C. § 12210(c) (2018); 28 C.F.R. § 35.131(b)(1) (2019). 
 172.  28 C.F.R. § 35.131(b)(2) (2019). 
 173.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (Two inmates with substance 
use disorders brought an action seeking injunctive relief against state parole authority officials, asserting 
“that they have been denied parole release dates because of their substance abuse histories.”); see also 
Smith v. Aroostook Cnty., 376 F. Supp. 3d 146, 160 (D. Me. 2019) (holding that Title II requires that a 
county jail continue treating an individual with opioid use disorder with her prescribed suboxone while 
incarcerated). 
 174.  See Toney v. Goord, No. 04-CV-1174, 2006 WL 2496859, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2006). 
 175.  Id.  
 176.  See id. 
 177.  Id. (“Plaintiff has not plead that he is a recovering drug addict, only that he is a drug addict.  
Thus, Plaintiff is not a qualified individual with a disability within the purviews of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12114 
and 12210.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 178.  Compare id. at *8 (“Plaintiff’s insistence on admittance to a drug rehabilitation program belies 
the notion that he ‘has been rehabilitated successfully. . .’”), with 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(2) (2009) 
(“Nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to exclude as a qualified individual with a disability an 
individual who . . . is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in 
such use.”). 
 179.  Toney, 2006 WL 2496859, at *8. 
 180.  Id. at *9. 
 181.  Id. 
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“handicap.”182  The FHA adopted the definition of handicap from the Rehabilitation 
Act,183 which courts have consistently interpreted to cover “alcoholics” and 
individuals addicted to illegal drugs.184  Further, the FHA implementing regulations, 
like those of the ADA, include in their definition for mental impairment “any mental 
or psychological disorder, such as . . . drug addiction (other than addiction caused by 
current, illegal use of a controlled substance) and alcoholism.”185  Despite explicit 
consideration in the legislative history and regulations, the FHA hardly provides a 
safe haven for individuals with substance use disorders. 
As with the ADA, when determining the timeline for “current” illegal drug use 
under the FHA, courts have refused to set a bright-line rule.  Some courts apply the 
employment-based current drug use analysis to housing.186  For example, Fowler v. 
Borough of Westville adopted the current drug use analysis established by Shafer, 
which determined that current drug use need not be use “at the exact moment that an 
adverse employment action was taken.”187  Even by applying that analysis, the 
Fowler court found that an individual in recovery who had relapsed four months after 
the complaint was filed was not considered a “current drug user,” thus qualifying as 
“handicapped” under the FHA.188  
The consideration of treatment is necessarily different in housing as compared 
to employment.  In both contexts, individuals who are abstinent and actively 
participating in treatment programs are—at least textually—qualified individuals, or 
individuals with a “handicap.”189  One important distinction that may serve to further 
insulate individuals under the FHA is that a major source of recovery treatment is 
residential-based care.190  The strong connection between housing and recovery-care 
has helped some plaintiffs find success.191  In Southern Management, the court held 
                                                                                                     
 182.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A)-(B) (1988). Despite the statute’s use of “handicap,” courts have 
typically interpreted the word interchangeably with “disability” under the ADA.  See Pacific Shores 
Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1156 n.15 (9th Cir. 2013).  For consistency, 
this article will continue to use “disability,” including when discussing the protected class status under 
the FHA. 
 183.  H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 22 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 2173, 2183 (stating that 
“the Committee intends that the definition be interpreted consistent with regulations clarifying the 
meaning of the similar provision found in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”). 
 184.  See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1987); Rogers v. Lehman, 
869 F.2d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1989); Tinch v. Walters, 765 F.2d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 1985); Simpson v. 
Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1231 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980); Crewe v. U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 834 
F.2d 140, 141 (8th Cir. 1987); Davis v. Burcher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 796-97 & n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
 185.  24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(2) (2020). 
 186.  See, e.g., Tracy P. v. Sarasota Cnty., No. 05-CV-927-T-27, 2007 WL 951740, at *5 (M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 28, 2007) (adopting the current use analysis from Zenor into the housing context). 
 187.  Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing Shafer v. 
Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 278-80 (4th Cir. 1997)).  
 188.  Id. at 609. 
 189.  29 U.S.C. § 794 (2016); 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (2018). See also, Davis, 451 F. Supp. at 796 
(holding that people with histories of drug use “including present participants in methadone 
maintenance programs are ‘handicapped individuals’ within the meaning of the statutory and regulatory 
language” of the Rehabilitation Act). 
 190.  See Rudolf H. Moos et al., Outcomes of Four Treatment Approaches in Community Residential 
Programs for Patients with Substance Use Disorders, 50 PSYCH. SERV. 1577, 1577 (1999). 
 191.  See, e.g., United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 921 (4th Cir.1992); Fowler, 97 F. 
Supp. 2d at 609 (finding plaintiff qualified for the safe harbor because there was “no evidence which 
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that individuals who abstained from drug use for one year were not excluded from 
the definition of “handicapped.”192  Despite their abstinence, the plaintiffs in the re-
entry portion of a recovery program were denied access to housing because of their 
history of drug use.193  The court found that “depriving such individuals of housing, 
or evicting them, would constitute irrational discrimination that may seriously 
jeopardize their continued recovery.”194  This holding has been cited dozens of times 
across circuits and in multiple contexts.195  However, few have adopted its warning 
about jeopardizing recovery.   
Courts have consistently moved the goal posts for recovery, as defined by the 
FHA and the ADA, notwithstanding the textual inclusion of individuals seeking 
recovery through participation in a rehabilitation program.196  For example, in A.B. 
v. Housing Authority of South Bend the plaintiff was evicted three weeks after being 
arrested for cocaine possession on the grounds that her arrest violated a lease 
provision prohibiting drug-related criminal activity on the property.197  Nine days 
before the eviction date, the plaintiff accepted a plea agreement that allowed her to 
withdraw her plea and move for a dismissal of her case if she successfully completed 
a substance-abuse program.198  Despite participation in the substance use treatment 
program, the Housing Authority sought to enforce the eviction.199  The plaintiff 
challenged the eviction alleging it was based on her disability of drug addiction, but 
the court determined that she did not qualify as an individual with a disability under 
the FHA, the ADA, or the Rehabilitation Act at the time of the eviction because she 
was deemed a “current user.”200   
The FHA is intended to eliminate discriminatory conduct, discriminatory 
impact, and the deeply embedded stigma held against marginalized groups.201  
Unfortunately, due to its treatment of substance use disorders as second-class 
disabilities, it falls short of this goal.  Individuals with a history of substance misuse 
continue to be evicted or denied housing based on preconceived notions, stereotypes, 
                                                                                                     
link[ed the plaintiff] to illegal drug use reasonably contemporaneous with the alleged incidents of 
discrimination”). 
 192.   S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d at 923. 
 193.  Id. at 921. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  See, e.g., Salley v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 980 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing 
employment under Title I of the ADA); Quinones v. Univ. of P.R., No. 14-1331 (JAG), 2015 WL 
631327, at *5 (D.P.R. Feb. 13, 2015) (discussing employment under Title II of the ADA); Tracy P. v. 
Sarasota Cnty., 2007 WL 951740, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2007) (discussing housing under the FHA).  
 196.  See, e.g., Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 857 (5th Cir. 1999); (“the mere 
fact that an employee has entered a rehabilitation program does not automatically bring that employee 
within the safe harbor's protection [which] applies only to individuals who have been drug-free for a 
significant period of time.”). 
 197.  A.B. v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, 498 F. App’x. 620, 621 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 622-23. 
 201.  See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Housing Discrimination Under the Fair Housing 
Act, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/fair_housing_act_overview 
[https://perma.cc/D7NB-QJNH] (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).  
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and stigma.  This is contrary to Congress’ intention.202  Of course, Congress’ own 
accumulated fears and prejudices have stood in the way of the FHA and ADA’s 
stated purpose since the “current use exception” was first drafted.203  
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The continued lapse in protections for individuals with one or more substance 
use disorders is unconscionable.  No other disability is subject to a bar on legal 
protections based on the experience of its symptoms.  Substance use disorders are 
undeniably relegated to second-class status.  
 Several remedial measures are available through the political branches.  
Statutory emendation or notice and comment rulemaking are both viable means to, 
at the very least, mitigate the “current use exception’s” harm.  Amending the 
regulations or making alterations to technical assistance manuals can potentially 
narrow the presently over-broad construction of “current use” employed by courts 
nationwide.  However, the “current use exception” is at the heart of the dimunution 
of substance use disorders relative to other disabilities.  The only way to eliminate 
the “badge of shame” that those with substance use disorder diagnoses must wear is 
to amend the relevant statutes to meet the precept of equality and dignity 
undergirding the ADA itself.   
A. Amend the Legislation 
The ADA, FHA, and Rehabilitation Act represent significant advances for the 
rights of individuals with disabilities.  The work done by the EEOC, DOJ, 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and private attorneys in 
combatting discrimination in the essential dimensions of everyday life should not be 
overlooked or under appreciated.  However, each statute has a fundamental flaw.  
Statutory treatment of substance use has fallen woefully behind the medical field’s 
understanding of the disorder and its symptoms.204  The relevant statutes’ lack of 
accounting for the symptomatic nature of relapse, the idiosyncrasy of recovery, and 
the necessity of security in employment, housing, and medical care all point to the 
ADA and FHA’s distance from a modern and informed view of substance use 
disorders.205  The singular barrier standing between our civil rights laws and a sound 
perspective on substance use disorders is the “current use exception.”  
1. Strike the Exception from the Statute 
The ADA was enacted to “assure equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” for individuals with 
                                                                                                     
 202.  See United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 923 (4th Cir.1992) (“[W]e believe that 
Congress intended to recognize that addiction is a disease from which, through rehabilitation efforts, a 
person may recover, and that an individual who makes the effort to recover should not be subject to 
housing discrimination based on society’s ‘accumulated fears and prejudices’ associated with drug 
addiction.”). 
 203.  See Quinones v. Univ. of P.R., No. 14-1331 (JAG), 2015 WL 631327, at *5 (D.P.R. Feb. 13, 
2015). 
 204.  See Kosten & George, supra note 18, at 13. 
 205.  See id. 
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disabilities,206 after Congress recognized the “existence of unfair and unnecessary 
discrimination and prejudice.”207  The “current use exception” undercuts this goal.  
How can a statute purport to promote equality for individuals with disabilities when 
it explicitly recognizes that substance use disorders are disabilities, but singles out 
the individuals experiencing their symptoms, and directly excludes them from 
statutory protection?  An individual with diabetes does not lose their disability status 
under the ADA simply for experiencing hypoglycemia.208  It is difficult to imagine 
a world where a single hypoglycemic episode would open an individual with diabetes 
up to termination from her job and eviction from her apartment.  However, that is 
the world that individuals with substance use disorders experience daily.  The ADA 
cannot stand for equality while it perpetuates inequality.  That inequality must be 
eliminated and the “current use exception” must be removed. 
Abolishing the “current use exception” will assuredly be met with reservations 
from a broad swath of interests.  First, the theoretical expediencies of a legislative 
solution come at the significant risk of inviting scrutiny to the ADA.  Any change to 
the ADA would require reexamination of the targeted passage and reexamination of 
the statute as a whole.  Many disability rights advocates would justifiably be 
concerned with the idea of subjecting the ADA to political scrutiny due to the risk 
that Congress may roll back other protections.  However, the potential for losing 
ground through statutory emendation must be weighed against the practical and 
symbolic harms caused by singling out and abandoning a specific subset of people 
on the basis of their disability.  
Additionally, employers will undoubtedly push back against removing the 
“current use exception.”  Employers may worry that individuals in active use will 
have free reign to bring illegal drugs onto their jobsites or come to work intoxicated.  
However, striking the “current use exception” would not eliminate employers’ 
ability to prevent either and likely would not even affect an employer’s ability to fire 
an employee with a substance use disorder who was arrested off-duty for drug 
possession.  
Worries such as those outlined above would be misinformed for several reasons.  
First, eliminating the “current use exception” would have no bearing on the illegality 
of possession or consumption of illegal drugs.  The ADA adopts the Controlled 
Substances Act’s interpretation of illegal drugs.209  An arrest for possession of a 
controlled substance, bringing a controlled substance to a jobsite, or showing up to 
work high could all be considered “disability-related conduct,” thus falling under the 
protections of the ADA without being subject to the “current use exception.”210  
However, employers are not required to accommodate individuals with disabilities 
if they pose an “undue hardship” or “direct threat” to themselves or others.211  
Second, doing away with the “current use exception” would not abrogate the 
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existence of the Drug Free Workplace Act’s requirements and prohibitions.212  Given 
the plethora of federal statutes punishing or disincentivizing the possession of illegal 
drugs, it is unlikely that an employer’s ability to manage the workplace would be 
materially impeded by the emendation.  Of course, changes to the statute—even less 
radical ones—would still greatly strengthen the ADA’s protections for individuals 
with substance use disorders. 
2. Treat Substance Use Disorders Involving Illegal Drugs the Same as Alcohol Use 
Disorder 
Statutory hierarchies divide up and rank substance use disorders themselves 
based on the substance at issue.213  “The [ADA] treats drug addiction and alcoholism 
differently.”214  For example, individuals with alcohol use disorder are subjected to 
significantly fewer inhibitions on their active use than other substance use disorders 
under the ADA.215  An individual with alcohol use disorder is not “automatically 
excluded from ADA protection because of current use of alcohol.”216  Thus, the 
current use of alcohol is not necessarily disqualifying for an individual seeking 
protection.217  Shifting the ADA’s treatment of individuals with addictions to illegal 
drugs towards the paradigm presently in place for those with alcohol use disorder 
may go a long way toward mitigating the harm done by the “current use exception,” 
while still maintaining an employer’s ability to take action if the “current use” affects 
an employee’s performance. 
The legality of alcohol consumption notwithstanding, alcohol use disorder is 
still a second-class disability.  Individuals with alcohol use disorder may 
theoretically be protected by the ADA while actively using, but functionally they are 
often equally susceptible to consequences for behavior in and out of the workplace 
as those using illegal drugs.218  Treating dependence on an illegal drug the same as 
alcohol dependence is a significantly less radical approach than striking the 
exception altogether.  Alcohol use disorder is still subject to the provision explicitly 
differentiating a disability from “disability-caused misconduct.”219  The significant 
difference that this switch would make is that the employer cannot act on the strict 
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basis of “current use,” such as firing someone for failing a drug test.220  The strategy 
could provide a middle-ground which would help secure individuals with substance 
use disorders beyond alcohol in their employment and de-stigmatize certain 
substance use disorders by removing hierarchies, while leaving employers with 
much of their existing control. 
3. Require Covered Entities to Provide a Last Chance Agreement to an Individual 
in Active Use Before Taking an Adverse Action 
Finally, rather than make any substantive changes to the “current use exception,” 
Congress could add a requirement that covered entities allow a person in active use 
the opportunity to seek rehabilitation and recovery before taking adverse action.  This 
conciliation tool, known as a “last chance agreement,” is already recognized in the 
EEOC’s technical assistance manual.221  Congress could amend the ADA to prevent 
employers from taking adverse action on the basis of a substance use disorder 
without first offering the chance for recovery, even if the person is currently using.  
This solution would not fundamentally alter the relationship between individuals 
with substance use disorders and their employers.  The employer would still be able 
to act based on current use.  However, giving employees a chance to seek treatment 
can provide the necessary cover to avoid discrimination that would otherwise go 
unchecked because of the “current use exception.”  Not only does this provide one 
extra step between an individual with a substance use disorder and potential 
unemployment or homelessness, it also encourages recovery where an unregulated 
employment action may not.  Overall, although it does nothing to address the 
inherent inequity in the ADA’s treatment of substance use disorders, a last chance 
agreement provision could help improve outcomes for individuals in active use.  
B. Executive Action 
If a legislative fix to the “current use exception” proves impossible, advocates 
should pursue regulatory solutions.  Agencies have a significant influence in shaping 
the analytical framework around the “current use exception.”222  The EEOC’s 
proffered timeline for measuring “current use” as a matter of “days or weeks” has 
done substantial damage to individuals seeking to prove that their recovery is 
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stable.223  If the goal is changing the treatment of individuals with substance use 
disorders under the ADA, change through the executive branch can induce preferable 
results in court and is less risky than a legislative fix. 
There are three main avenues that regulatory and enforcement bodies can utilize 
to decrease the percentage of individuals who have faced wrongful discrimination 
but were denied legal recourse because they were not abstinent for a year at the time 
of the adverse action.  They are:  (1) revision of the regulations, (2) adjusting the 
technical assistance and interpretive guidance, and (3) active participation in 
litigation involving aggrieved individuals in recovery.   
First, the EEOC and DOJ could consider revising their current regulations.  Both 
the EEOC224 and DOJ225 are tasked with promulgating regulations implementing 
their respective titles of the ADA.  Under EEOC guidance, “current use” means “the 
illegal use of drugs that has occurred recently enough to indicate that the individual 
is actively engaged in such conduct.”226  Courts have expressly relied on this 
definition in making their respective determinations on the plaintiff’s recovery.227  
Even a slight addition, borrowing from elsewhere in the EEOC’s Title I regulations, 
could go a long way in improving the standards by which recovery is judged.  
When assessing whether an individual imposes a “direct threat” to the health 
and safety of himself or those around him, the EEOC regulations require that the 
determination rely on “reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current 
medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.”228  It is unclear 
why a similar evidentiary burden could not be adopted in the “current use” context.  
The amended regulations could read that “current use” means “the illegal use of 
drugs that has occurred recently enough to indicate that, based on reasonable medical 
judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best 
available objective evidence, the individual is actively engaged in such conduct.”  
This would necessitate an individualized assessment based on objective medical 
evidence, unless the person is being physically caught in the act of using drugs.  Not 
only would it require more than just a “reasonable belief,” but it would reduce anti-
substance use stigma by recognizing it as a medical condition.229  
Second, the current EEOC guidance does little more to elucidate a workable 
definition of “current use” than the regulations.230  The simplest solutions to the 
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EEOC guidance are, first, to adopt the direct threat language from the regulations 
and eliminate the days or weeks metric.  Focusing purely on lengths of time is 
harmful and reductive.231  Adopting a standard which emphasizes an individualized 
inquiry through the lens of objective medical fact can inform whether someone’s 
recovery is truly stable.  The length of his or her period of abstinence may be 
informative, but it is not dispositive.  This strategy could be criticized as doing little 
to actually clarify a workable standard for the exception.  That may be true.  
Therefore, the proposed revisions to the guidance should be joined by strong EEOC 
and DOJ participation in litigation involving individuals with substance use 
disorders. 
As it stands, individuals are required to file a complaint with the EEOC before 
they bring a claim of employment discrimination under Title I of the ADA.232  The 
EEOC can choose to pursue the complaint or issue a right to sue letter, dismissing 
the agency’s involvement in the case and allowing it to go forward privately.  
Emendation to the standards and regulations is not required.  However, a new, 
narrower definition of “current” could embolden the EEOC to more vigorously 
pursue claims vindicating the rights of individuals in recovery.  As of now, the EEOC 
participates in very few cases involving substance use disorders.233  More zealous 
advocacy in this area can expand the number of individuals in recovery who qualify 
for the safe harbor by clarifying the EEOC’s interpretation on its own guidance 
through application to the facts of a trial.  
CONCLUSION 
The ADA is fundamentally flawed.  Though it provides some of the most 
comprehensive civil rights protections of any statute passed in the last fifty years, it 
still falls far short of its goal of promoting equality for all individuals with 
disabilities.  It would offend most people’s sense of justice to allow an employer to 
fire an individual with diabetes for a blood sugar spike, or a landlord to evict an 
individual with epilepsy after experiencing a seizure in their apartment.  Yet, the 
ADA does not only allow for discrimination against individuals on the basis of their 
substance use disorders, the text implicitly encourages it. 
 A lapse in protection for individuals with substance use disorders who are 
currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs reflects the deeply ingrained stigma this 
country holds against people who suffer from the disease.  There is clear medical 
consensus on addiction as a chronic brain disease, which has a strong influence over 
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volition, executive functioning, and physical well-being.234  However, even our 
disability rights laws treat substance use as a moral failing rather than a medical 
condition.  The ADA’s recognition of substance use disorders as disabilities were 
likely little comfort to the plaintiffs of Smith235 and Lejeune.236  If one can be written 
off as a “current user” who is unworthy of protections, despite having six months of 
sustained abstinence and a willingness to work, what good was the designation in the 
first place?  Until this stigma is addressed and the “current use exception” is stricken 
from the United States Code, substance use disorders will remain second-class 
disabilities. 
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